Archive for the 'Governance' Category

A response to Telco’s and Disintermediation

A guest response to this post, written by Paul

Ok I confess, I’m the other party Ben is referring to and yes I work for a Telco. I’m posting this because Ben kind of got the gist of my argument a bit wrong.

So in order to clarify here’s my starting position.  I really like SaaS. I believe that SaaS and Telcos go really well together. I believe that SaaS providers underestimate their reliance on Telcos (and I’m not the only one - see this from Gigaom and the unreasonablemen.net). I believe that Telcos don’t really understand the internet that well in general.

The starting point of my discussion with Ben was that I was reading this report from Heavy Reading - Reinventing the Telco. I personally hate the document, I think it asks all the wrong questions, having said that it has some interesting facts within it.

I was discussing implications of Telcos and SaaS with Ben, and Ben then asked me what would happen if the Telco got disintermediated at the transmission layer by an application provider.  This hypothetical application provider would swoop in, change the game and everything would be cheaper and paid for by the services on top of the network.

I told Ben that it won’t happen for a  lot of technical and commercial reasons. He replied with his standard response of mass disintermediation and the services ruling the world. I told him he doesn’t really understand the dynamics at action here. (with IM one gets quite blunt!)

This is my reasoning .

First some scene setting. A direct quote from Heavy Reading.

Microsoft & Google bestride the internet like twin colossi, yet between them earn less than a single large incumbent Telco

Added to that MS and Google are global entities, incumbents are normally based in one nation. Bingo - perspective.

It would take a lot more money that either of these companies have to build a global network (what’s the point of a regional one?). That means they would have to either borrow, or convince their shareholders that they will get a fantastically good return on the capital invested if they got into the network game.

Either way, it means that the application provider who moves into the network game HAS to get a good return on its investments. (That is operate at super-normal margins or “telco margins”)

Let that hang for a second…  What that effectively means is that if Google did this they COULD NOT tank the network margins…they need them to repay the debt they owe to the shareholders. It doesn’t actually matter if you use either of Ben’s formulae for making money.

Total cost = (Telco pipe price + Margin) + (Web Service Cost + Margin)

Total cost = (Network Cost + Web Service Cost) * Margin

Because if you are Google in the network game, and do the second option, your pricing is going to be so high (to get the return on capital invested) you will effectively price yourselves out of the application game.

As a working example, you could get hosted email for $2 per seat from Zoho, but Google with its network cost and associated margins (and its need to repay the faith its shareholders put in it to invest in networks) would be $5 or 10 per seat, the actual numbers are irrelevant.  The fact is they would be an order of magnitude out… and that means no game. If you do the first option, well then you are a Telco…

For Google things are even more desperate. Eric Schmidt (Google CEO) has the unenviable job of trying to deliver on market expectations that are quite simply unreasonable. Google’s PE ratio is 40, Microsoft’s is 17, BT’s is 11. That means that the market out there is paying $40 dollars for every dollar of earnings from Google. Essentially Google’s shareholders are expecting growth in profits, lots and lots of growth, twice as much growth as MS and 4x as much as BT.  This doesn’t leave Eric and the boys a lot of room for being egalitarian. What it does point to is a company that will try and maximise the margins on any industry it enters… in fact they could be worse than the incumbents!

My final point with Ben was that if Google or MS did play this way, eventually the titans would respond and they’ve got deep pockets. If the Telcos (many who still own directories or have massive databases of users) wanted to get into the online advertising market…lets say for free (ie keep your internet with us and we’ll give you free ads) then Goggle is in trouble. I’m saying that the threat response such a move would illicit would (over time admittedly) be very very serious for Google (by the way, this isn’t a post about Google - similar moves could be done for CRM, hosted desktop applications etc).

The answer I think lies somewhere in the middle. Telcos don’t get the internet and generally speaking aren’t good at innovation, applications providers don’t understand the network but are good at innovation and services. I think a symbiotic approach would work best because as the diagram from the unreasonablemen.net points out, the service experience of SaaS customers is dependant on both elements working.

I would say that Ben is fundamentally wrong in his assertion that Telcos don’t understand the long tail. Its what they do, they make a little bit from a lot of people. Think about it, the average subscription to a Telco is less than a SaaS seat cost. They do this on top of massive infrastructure costs and are still successful. I’d argue that in fact, SaaS providers could learn a lot from Telcos in that respect…

Disclosure, I work for Gen-i the ICT division of Telecom.

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What place Government?

Warning - here follows a rant not at all related to my usual subject matter!

We’ve seen some governmental debacles in the last few days. Firstly the New Zealand taxpayer agreed (or their representatives did anyway) to buy the rail network back off Toll holdings. Bear in mind that this is the same rail network we sold years ago, it’s fallen into disrepair and is under-utilised. It appears that the selling party played a bluffing game, feigning reluctance to sell in order to ratchet up the price.

In any private sector setting this sort of game-playing would be picked up by the other side. In a situation where the negotiation is occurring headed by elected representatives with very little real world experience, and in positions of power vastly greater than their skills, experience and ability would deserve what happened? The said negotiators took the bait - hook, line and sinker - paying what analysts believe is an over-inflated price for the business.

Not only that but it now appears the deal was full of insider trading, whereby the managing director of Toll holdings personally bought a large parcel of shares only days before the deal was inked - his personal windfall is estimated at over $300k.

And then today it appears the the former head of a large government department had a fictitious PhD on her CV. Again in the real world CV’s are checked for authenticity - one can only surmise that the powers that be who hired this employee were so excited by the letter PhD that they omitted to do standard due diligence.

So what’s the answer then? Well perhaps electing representatives with a bit of nous would be a start, moving to a model where politicians and civil servants where accountable for their actions would be another.

Either way we have an ongoing saga of ineptitude.

Right - that’s off my chest now…..

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Xero year end results…

Hot of the press are the Xero year end (at 31 March 2008) financial reports. Key highlights include (with my comments in italics);

  • Revenue from subscriptions of $134,000 less than expected - key will be the figures to the end of May 2008 - projected  revenue from the prospectus is $550000
  • Operating expenses of $5,146,000 that’s a significant burn rate which is fine if revenue ramps up significantly
  • A net loss for the year of $4,310,000
  • Cash and bank balances of $9,517,000

An interesting read is the unaudited comparison between the results and the projections detailed in the prospectus - again with my comments in italics;

  • In the 12 months since Xero’s Offer Document was issued Xero achieved 1406 customers. 1300 were forecast. but at a lower subscription rate than forecast - is this what Chris Anderson meant about the “trend towards free”?
  • Generated revenue in the United Kingdom while no revenue was forecast from either the UK or Australia in the first year. awesome - it’d be interesting to know what those revenue figures actually are
  • Receipts from customers of $213,000 was lower than the updated (February 1 2008) forecast of $250,000 - $350,000 for three main reasons not sure why receipts from customers figure is different from the revenue from subscriptions figure - perhaps Rod can advise?

the assumed average pricing is $75 (plus GST) per customer per month, based on Xero’s current level of functionality. There will be no significant change in pricing during the prospective period.

  • The customer growth curve Xero experienced was weighted towards the end of the period as sales accelerated at the commencement of the 2008/2009 financial year hmmmm - but it’s hard not to think that anyone contemplating signing up for the 2008/2009 would have done so prior to 1 Aprl and would therefore be included in these figures
  • Greater focus on accountants in the first year, and their request for Xero to spend more time on the core accounting engine rather than value added services. Therefore average revenue per customer was less than the assumption included in Xero’s Offer Document which can only but suggest that either the focus on accountants strategy was wrong or the prospectus projections were flawed
  • Less new customers than expected took advantage of the option for a one year in advance payment discount, preferring to pay monthly
  • arguably the primary reason for the lower revenue than projection  (especially given the higher than expected customer count) is the fact that Xero had to drop it’s subscription rate from that indicated in the prospectus. The following is a direct quote from the prospectus;
  • Costs were less than forecast and interest income was greater than forecast resulting in a better closing cash position by $613,000. Closing cash balance at 10 May was $8,991,000 compared to $8,378,000 contained in the Offer Document
  • So overall an interesting result, nothing o shout from the rooftops but not completely off track either. Bottom line is that Xero needs to ramp things up - fast!

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    On why Facebook borrowed to buy hardware

    Yesterday I queried the Facebook strategy of owning it’s own datacentre infrastructrue - especially given it’s (hoped for) growth and the prevalence of other scalable, cloud based third party hosting solutions.

    Henry Blodget asks another question in this post this morning. The main thrust of his post is that the MS deal last year valued Facebook at $15bill. The easiest for them to pay for the hardware they need would be to flip off a little more stock in return for cash. Henry contends that the reason they’re borrowing (which puts all the shareholders at risk if Facebook ever loses value) is that they’re not able to sell equity at the sort of valuation they need to to avoid people getting fearful that the entire business was over-hyped.

    Short term it’s no big deal, but at some stage the shareholder will start to squirm that debt keps being taken on to fund growth. Very soon the wolves will start baying demanding either;

    • A clear monetisation path (and at the sort of rates that are commensurate with the valuation)
    • An equity sell down (which needs to realistically be at least at the most recent sell down valuation

    Both of these options are hard to envisage in the current climate.

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    MS considering a Facebook purchase?

    Right off the bat I need to admit that I’m in no position to second guess Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft. But reports in the last couple of days point to discussions between Facebook and Microsoft about an acquisition of the social networking giant by the beast of Redmond.

    Lets look at why Microsoft needs to do something;

    Clearly MS’s web strategy hasn’t been overly successful - they’re a company that has made all it’s money by creating software that gets installed on corporate and home machines. Changing its business model to one that derives revenue from web advertising, a la Google, is a real challenge. As most commentators agree, it’s very hard for a business to give up a great (but shaky) income stream to move to a new way of doing business that risks all that. (Especially a business that has Wall St to answer t)

    While one would think that with the resource base that MS has they could create a scaled and profitable internet business on their own but history tells us it’s just not in their corporate DNA.

    Hence the acquisition trail - and the last few months talks with Yahoo which some would say have now broken down completely.

    Which gets us back to Facebook. I just don’t get it - sure Facebook has squillions of eyeballs, but most realistic commentators agree that it is at the plateau of its growth phase - user activity (and remember that it’s user activity that MS wants, not new subscribers - after all it is continuing eyeballs that create value for advertisers) has fallen and FB seems to be wandering aimlessly trying to find ways to keep existing users engaged - chat being the latest (and, it has to be said, pooly executed) development.

    So my advice to Steve - don’t do it, Facebook is just the latest in the fad fueled Web 2.0 startups, much better to work a new monetization channel beyond advertising - rather than trying to catch Gogle at their own game, create a game with entirely new rules.

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    Was I wrong about Burger Fuel?

    This morning I read that Burger Fuel are expanding their operations outside of the current Australasian spread and have sold a franchise to Dubai. In the past I’ve been somewhat sceptical of Burger Fuel, both pre, during and post IPO. After reading the news I momentarily thought that perhaps I’d been a little hard on BF.

    I was relieved (for my own sake entirely) to read this post by Dan who has spent time working in the UAE. Dan says that;

    If the announcement had been that the first store was at Mall of the Emirates you know it would have done well because the food court there is always pretty busy. But instead the first store is at Festival City. I visited Festival City last August and it was a ghost town.

    In defence of BF, Dan did go on to say that Festival City is not yet finished and may well prove more popular once it is. I remain firmly positioned on the fence, and leaning heavily towards the paddock of scepticism!

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    The perils of online storage…

    I’ve talked about online storage and sync in the past (see here and here). My perspective has always been two fold;

    1. Don’t store, but sync. Storage at one location only is a recipe for disaster - websites go down as much as hard drives fail. Syncing however means you create your own redundencies
    2. Do due diligence - there is a reason that startups IPO rather than self-fund (and reasons beyond money). Listing build credibility (as, it has to be said, does backing by well known VCs). With sync/storage options always check your supplier for potential future problems which could put your data at risk

    I was reminded by this when reading Mike’s post about Omnidrive - the online backup service that seems to be dead and buried. Reading the comments on this RWW post (which foretold of Omnidrive’s demise) is a sad tale of woe, and a warning to both startups and users of new offerings.

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    Diversity in governance needed…

    An interesting article this morning calling for more Diversity in corporate boards (actually it called for more diversity but I couldn’t help plug Diversity Ltd’s governance experience!).

    I’ve had a bit to do with the pool of professional directors in New Zealand and I have to say I came away a little unimpressed. I’m sure the pool is useful for legacy industries (the sort of low value add commodity stuff that we’re all meant to be moving away from), but I can’t help but think that they’re in a little over their heads when it comes to hi-growth, hi-tech companies.

    I’ve heard all the arguments that say that the most important thing is having experience with growth (no matter what the domain) ad the connections of well regarded directors are valuable but I’m not so sure;

    1. Most companies with independent boards in New Zealand are slow growth, legacy businesses - I’m not sure how that translates into fast moving experience
    2. especially for hi-tech businesses, connections are less important than product and scale - sure experience can help with execution but most non-executive directors that I know are reluctant to be so involved as to have a real hand in operational execution

    I’m 100% in favour of independent boards for small and larger businesses, but believe that the current pool of candidates doesn’t inspire confidence in those considering appointing a board.

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    Facebook chat is live!

    Just in time to watch twitter steal it’s thunder, Facebook has released it’s chat app. I’ve posted before suggesting that Facebook has already reached its zenith, chat may well stem the tide of defectors (after all im is a cool thing and adds to the stickiness, especially when “friends” no longer post in the news feed).

    I’m thinking that Facebook is running hard trying to find some way to gain and retain membership and traffic - their growth curve has flattened out and they’re grasping for ways to buoy it up. Shame they didn’t IPO 6 months ago huh?

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    Someone else rebuffs Microsoft’s advances…

    The blogosphere is mildly warm with talk about Microsoft’s attempts to acquire…… no not Yahoo but Xobni.

    Xobni (inbox spelt backwards) (Diversity coverage here) is a cool Outlook plugin that brings some social networking and efficiency functionality to the MS offering. Apparently Xobni has said;

    we’re staying an independent company and will be exiting beta soon

    In appreciation of Xobni’s attempts to stay independent (and how long it’ll last no-one knows), Diversity Blogs has a few invites to become a beta tester of Xobni. Just leave a comment to this post and we can hook you up quick smart.

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