Tag Archive for 'Salesforce.com'

Ellison on SaaS…

Sometimes it’s hard to know how to take Ellison’s missives on SaaS. Bear in mind that Ellison, the CEO of Oracle, is also the founder and largest single shareholder in Netsuite (and also a major shareholder, for good measure in, salesforce.com which was founded by an ex-employee of his).

In his latest earnings call, Ellison said that the entire SaaS industry is unprofitable. He comments on the performance of salesforce.com, saying;

If you look at the leader, Salesforce.com, they don’t make very much money and they’ve been at it for almost 10 years, It’s hard to point to any software-as-a-service provider that’s doing a good job of improving its profitability

He gets a little conciliatory about the future prognosis saying;

We continue to get better at it [building revenue] and grow the business, [But] it’s not really growing any faster than our overall business. We think that’s going to change over time. But the entire on-demand industry has to get better at making money in selling on-demand software

Seems like Ellison likes to cover all his bases, it’s hard not to think however that his comments aren’t helpful for his own SaaS holdings, and even less helpful for the myriad of SaaS start-ups out there trying to get a toe in the door - especially those trying to give enterprise a nudge.

Larry - a little more positivity please!

Who is using Force.com?

A number of prominent blogs including Renee Boucher Ferguson, Sinclair Schuller and Bob Warfield this morning wrote about the outcome of an informal straw poll conducted during a panel discussion hosted by Phil Wainewright at the OpSource SaaS summit this week.

In a show of hands, Out of 250 ISV’s attending the summit,only 2 were planning to use Force.com as their Dev Platform. (40 responded yes to building their own SaaS platform and 10 to a Software plus Services approach). Bob and Sinclair discuss their viewpoint on reasons why this was the case.

Some of these points included
1. Salesforce.com is not a neutral platform.
2. Its more of an “Extension platform” not a revolutionary one.
3. Bob adds that its too expensive an option.

So what is the sweetspot for Force.com? Bob rightly points out that it will appeal to Internal IT departments within Enterprise already using Salesforce.com as they are not as price sensitive. I agree with this as my experience at Dreamforce when Apex was first announced a couple of years ago, IT Department employees sitting at my dinner table were excited at the prospects of building their own modules, while the ISV’s sitting at the same table were lukewarm.

I believe Force.com will find its dominant niche in areas which are CRM related. So I actually think its sweetspot will be vertical offerings of CRM. http://www.verticalsondemand.com, a Pharma CRM system built on Force.com is a prime example of this.

The challenge of gaining a significant foothold into general SaaS platforms is a far greater one for Force.com. There are many SaaS solutions and ideas which are not customer centric at all. Maybe this is where Platform as a Service is heading? Specific Value Add platforms for specific business functions.

This was originally posted by the author, Troy Wing on his personal blog.

Scale Benefits in Action

I’ve been thinking a bit more about SaaS. & scale. One of the assertions I made in my previous post was that companies that achieve scale get more profit. I wrote a piece previously on SaaS provider profitability in it I put this diagram from Mckinseys

economics21.jpg

The key element to note here is that both traditional and SaaS businesses are less profitable by a factor of 2 until they reach a certain revenue point, in this instance $1.2b.

If you look at the recent financial announcement from SF.com, they are clearly getting into the Economies of Scale (EoS) zone. As a snapshot, PROFIT is going up faster than revenue. This could be from a lot of things, all benefits of scale

  • · Brand recognition. People, a lot of people have now heard of SF. That means selling and marketing expenses should come down. By they way, having lots of people know who you are is scale in marketing terms
  • · Partner programs. SF are now so topical, they have others selling for them.
  • · PaaS, the interesting thing about EoS, its driven by volume. PaaS has given its providers a commercially viable way of increasing their volume very quickly
  • · Reduced development. I know SF put out a new release every quarter, but after 9 years or so you would have to assume that they a) have cracked the architecture and b) broken the back of their development..i mean how much more CRM functionality can you add?

To me this diagram graphically reinforces the benefits of a scale and particularly the PaaS and potentially gives Salesforce.com a huge advantage.

What isn’t clear is if PaaS drive scale and profitability benefits to its other subscribers. For instance, Bob at Smothspan really takes SF to task on its PaaS pricing

I don’t think Salesforce.com, of all players, “gets” some aspects of the Business Model. If they did, they would radically alter the pricing on the Platform-as-a-Service offering, because the current pricing, even the radically revised pricing, is completely off target for a SaaS vendor. The service is priced at $50 a month in its normal configuration. Let me explain why that’s crazy. ….. Salesforce themselves get by for a lot less. ….Most SaaS players charge $50 or less each month for their service, so this math will almost never work.

What struck me at the time was the assertion that SF could do this at a lot less than $50. My reasoning went like this, the SF marketing folks would know their costs, be charged with making some profit and hence do a mark up on the price. I did wonder if this meant that SF themselves hadn’t actually achieved the scale benefits? Perhaps they are playing a strategic game here. Giving others an ecosystem that allows them to subsist but marginalises their profits.

I searched for the pricing of other platform providers to see if this SF price was way outta wack but didn’t find anything. If you are in the PaaS game, please feel free to comment.

As a final comment, two things strike me. 1) the PaaS provider market is about to heat up - just look at the number of SaaS companies coming online… they all need a platform and these guys could do very well out of this and 2) SF shares should be in high demand . Why? they look like they are at a profit inflection point, they don’t really have a SaaS or PaaS competitor of note within any sort of striking distance and finally i referr you back to the diagram. Large software companies (showing clear signs of EoS ) simply make more EBITDA.

(The unreasonablemen or diversity are not share brokers, you should consult a professional before purchasing any shares)

Some thoughts on SaaS acquisitions

Note: This is a mirror post from my unreasonablemen blog. Over on Smoothspan, Bob asks the question “when do the SaaS acquisition games begin?”. This got me thinking, about the why, who, how and impact of acquisition on SaaS.

Firstly, I agree with Bob, the market is young & fragmented. The impact of this on acquisition is quite profound. People will acquire for position rather than to consolidate because the market is still growing. In a new growing market there are only two strategy plays that really matter. A race strategy (get the most customers as fast as possible). Salesforce.com is doing this with its PaaS play. If you win the race you can turn the strategy into a position strategy (we dominate, have the most customers, are the most attractive to partners, new entrants, or have deep pockets for acquisition etc, have the most differentiation because of this & hence retain the position). Microsoft runs a position strategy for desktop apps.

Back to acquisition. If you are already in the SaaS game, you are probably in a race strategy. Therefore if you have achieved a lead (to some degree) you may be looking to acquire to get further in the lead. Effectively buying customers or technology that will give you more customers (has a wow factor or fills out your stack & removes an objection). SF.com buying Kieden is an example.

If you are a SaaS player & haven’t got a lead, then you should be looking to be bought or you need to think about specialisation. You are loosing the mass market horizontal race so stop trying.

If you aren’t in the SaaS game, otherwise known as ‘being disrupted’, then you are looking to acquire a horse already in the race. The rumoured Oracle SF.com tie up is a good example of this.

If you subscribe to my two strategic views above, none of the acquisition moves are surprising.

To me the most interesting part of the acquisition trend is what the acquirer does with the acquiree when they’ve got them. That is how well do they use the new asset to deliver on the strategy. Both have their challenges.

If you are a SaaS provider on your own infrastructure (platform) then you are going to be forced with the challenge of integration. This is different from ‘making them work together’ which should be fairly easy given that AJAX & webservices are cornerstones of SaaS & there are many instances of this around. But integrating two applications & databases onto the same platform is a big challenge to me. Identity management, billing, reporting, management , the DNA of the code itself make this a challenging task.

If you are a SaaS provider on a platform like Apprenda or SF.com then the integration task is easier, markedly easier. All (ok most) of those technical details go away because you are already integrated in the backend.These two plays also have the benefit of culturally being aligned behind SaaS, having a channel & billing model that is optimised for SaaS perhaps most importantly management. & remuneration models that support SaaS.

Legacy providers have a different set of challenges once they have acquired. Do they integrate it into the they’re legacy product like the S+S by Microsoft play? how do they run the business, how do they sell it , how do they manage the cannibalisation or disruption of the legacy business if they’ve bought an app in they’re existing space (Siebel & SF.com for instance). Perhaps even more importantly, how do they maintain focus on SaaS while running a legacy business.

Those who read my blog will know that I’m very hot on this. In my opinion if you don’t run the startup separate from the legacy, then the mothership will negativity impact the new entity.

Here is the analogy. Farming. Farmers know that the game is cyclical, that the tree’s that provide the most produce now are only good for a limited time and that they need continuously have new crops or replacement tree’s coming on board. Those tied to cash crops for survival understand that they are in big trouble. Over farming means that eventually the tree will wither. If you continue with this behaviour, you will turn your land into a dessert (the Sahara is an example). Continuing on with this analogy. Those farmers that do have replacement tree’s usually grow them in a separate paddock. They do this so that the new plants have the best chance to thrive. The seedlings get the appropriate attention and aren’t shaded by the large trees.

Not rocket science and yet business continuously fail to adhere to this most basic wisdom. They often throw their innovation centre in with the rest of the business and expect it to survive (read the innovators dilemma for examples). When the harvest comes due (i.e. reporting season), these companies run to the big revenue levers and neglect the startup, so it fails to hit its numbers and disappoints. Why? The people who know how to look after big tree’s often don’t know how to look after seedlings, or even worse see the seedling as a threat and actively work to stunt its growth.

All of this points to the obvious decision not to integrate the new SaaS acquisition into the legacy business. If the legacy business is serious about winning the race in the SaaS game, leave it alone. Let the SaaS business come to you with they’re requirements & give your legacy business targets & remuneration models that support this race.